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International political science became an independent sector of
intellectual endeavor immediately following the Second World
War. Thirty years have passed in the interim and it is time to ex-
amine a set of interconnected assumptions about international law
underpinning the theoretical foundations of international political
science. A major unarticulated premise of this discipline is that in-
ternational law is essentially irrelevant to a proper understanding
of the dynamics of international politics and therefore irrelevant to
the progressive development of international political theory as a
science. International political science repudiates both the descrip-
tive validity and the prescriptive worth of international legal con-
siderations for that sector of international relations dealing with
matters of "vital national interest" or of "high international polit-
ics."
The foremost example of this phenomenon is the collection of
essays written in honor of Professor Leo Gross of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, entitled The Relevance of Interna-
tional Law.' The reputed purpose of the book is to analyze the
relevance of international law to the problems of war and peace, to
the challenge Third World countries present to the stability of the
international system, to the growth of international organizations,
and to the consequent evolution of "world order." Yet a lead essay
of the collection strives mightily to refute what is supposed to be its
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1. THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1971).
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main proposition - namely, that international law is relevant to
international politics and international political science.2
Responsibility for this situation is attributed to the alleged fact
that contemporary international affairs manifest a "revolutionary"
and "heterogeneous" nature as opposed to a "moderate" and "ho-
mogeneous" nature due to the existence of a variety of political,
economic, cultural, demographic, and scientific factors. Such fac-
tors include dissolution of the classical balance of power, world-
wide revolutionary insurgency, destructive nuclear weapons
systems, the relentless power of nationalistic fervor, division of the
world into hostile ideological camps, uncurbed exponential popula-
tion growth, and unremitting technological and industrial innova-
tion.3  These elements interact synergistically to create an
international political environment irremediably inhospitable to
the application, growth, and well-being of international law. The
irrelevance of international law will persist until the world returns
to the conditions of relatively simple placidity that characterized its
formative period. In other words, international law will not be-
come relevant to international politics in the foreseeable or even
distant future.4
Another variant on the same theme is that there subsists a
milange of inherently debilitating characteristics fundamental to
legal education and training, to the processes of legal reasoning, to
the practice of law, and to the legal profession. These debilitating
characteristics seriously impede if not prevent a lawyer from ever
becoming a decent let alone consummate statesman. To enumerate
just a few:
1. the narrow-minded development of legal principles through
the technique of analogical reasoning;
2. the piecemeal accumulation of such principles into a conse-
quentially formalistic doctrine of little practical utility;
2. Hoffmann, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELEVANCE OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 34 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffman eds. 1971).
3. See also S. HOFFMANN, GULLIVER'S TROUBLES, OR THE SETTING OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 17-51 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN POLICY]; Hoffmann, Interna-
tional Systems and International Law, in THE STATE OF WAR 88 (1965).
4. Even Hoffmann's brilliant analysis of American foreign policy in Primacy or World
Order (1978) does not discuss the relevance of international law to the pursuit of the system
of world order the author advocates. Subject to the same criticism is Morgenthau, Emergent
Problems of United States Foreign Policy, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67
(K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1971), which was expanded into 4 New Foreign Policy/or
the United States (1969).
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3. the disregard of crucial facts in search for the broad princi-
ple, or vice versa;
4. the rigidity of legal analysis and methodology;
5. the stubborn insistence upon rules, agreements, and expecta-
tions when circumstances have been materially altered so as
to render them obsolete or useless;
6. the play-it-by-the-book attitude and innate conservatism this
fosters;
7. the stifling of intuition, creativity, and initiative; and
8. a preference for manipulation of a given set of rules within
an established game, instead of a preference for the creation
of a new game with an entirely different set of rules.
These alleged constituents of the legal mind are postulated to be
thoroughly inadequate to achieve success and may even be counter-
productive when brought to bear upon international political
problems. Solving international political problems require freedom
and agility in thought and analysis, imagination, flexibility, a high
tolerance for risk-taking, and adroitness at rule-making, rule-
breaking, and game invention. In comparison to international po-
litical scientists, such qualities are lacking or at least are intolerably
deficient in the international legal profession. In essence, this cri-
tique reduces itself to the dubious assumption that lawyers are not
by nature opportunistic and unprincipled enough to function well
in an international political arena where Machiavellian power
politics and raison d'tat are the order of the day.5
Henry Kissinger's exposition of this thesis has become stan-
dard textbook reading for introductory courses in international po-
litical science.6 It is apparent, however, that Kissinger spent only
one year (1954-1955) as a special student at the Harvard Law
School7 and never practiced law for a corporate law firm. From
this perspective, the success of Dean Acheson as one of the great
American Secretaries of State is an anomaly achieved in spite of,
rather than because of, his professional origins. To an international
lawyer, the reason for Acheson's superlative performance in foreign
affairs is intuitively obvious. To quote Professor Harold Berman of
the Harvard Law School: "Anyone who can become a senior part-
ner at Covington & Burling must afortiori be a superb realist."8
5. See generally G. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 (1951).
6. Kissinger, The Nature of Leadershiu, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 27 (1969).
7. See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, ALUMNI DIRECTORY 395 (1978).
8. Discussion with Professor Harold J. Berman, Harvard Law School, Cambridge,
Mass. (September 1975). See also H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 22, 31, 58-62 (1979);
Berman, Law as an Instrument ofPeace in US-Soviet Relations, 22 STAN. L. REV. 943
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The logical conclusion to both of the aforementioned political
science critiques of the relevance of international law is that when-
ever statesmen in good faith interject determinative considerations
of international law into attempted solutions for the monumental
problems of international politics, the probability that violence,
war, defeat, death, and destruction will ensue is enormously in-
creased. Strident adherence to international law is dangerous to the
continued existence of mankind because the states of the world pre-
cariously survive in the primordial Hobbesian state of nature,
where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."9 Here there
exist no law or justice, no conception of right or wrong, and no
morality - only a struggle for survival in a state of war waged by
every state against every state.' 0 The acquisition of power and ag-
grandizement at the expense of other states in a quest for unattaina-
ble absolute national security is the fundamental right, the
fundamental law, and the fundamental fact of international polit-
ics.l" Statesmen who obey the dictates of international law invite
destruction at the hands of aggressors and thereby facilitate the de-
struction of third parties, which, in today's interdependent world,
cannot realistically hope to remain neutral in a serious conflict be-
tween major powers.
B. Qualiication of the Problem
In their affirmance of the irrelevance of international law, in-
ternational political scientists do not intend to imply that considera-
tions of international law play no important part in the conduct of
international relations. They are astute enough to recognize that
international law is pervasive in both its presence and its effect
throughout the international system. It directly regulates or indi-
rectly seeks to influence (whether successfully or not) the entire
course of international relations, from seemingly the most insignifi-
cant of matters, all the way along the continuum of international
political importance to the macrocosmic questions of war or peace
and life or death for people, states, and civilizations.
Within this scheme of things, it is also undeniable that interna-
(1970); Comment, Lawyer-Secretaries of Foreign Relations of the United States, 3 AM. J.
INT'L L. 942 (1909).
9. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962).
10. Hobbes asserted that international politics was one of three states of nature. The
other two were the mythical state of nature and civil war. All three, however, were tanta-
mount to a state of war. Id. at 101.
11. Compare with id. at 103-04.
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tional organizations play a significant role. International organiza-
tions, from the smallest organization to the United Nations, are
tangible manifestations of the effective operation of international
law. International organizations come into existence, grow, pros-
per, and serve mankind, because their respective founding states
sign multilateral treaties that become the constitutional documents
for the organizations, and subsequent members accede to the prin-
ciples of law enunciated therein. International organizations are
the creative products of international law.
International political scientists are willing to concede these
points. Indeed, a separate school of international political science
has developed out of this concession - the so-called "functional-
integrationist" approach to international relations. This approach
is best exemplified by Ernst Haas' definitive study of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization.
12
The title of Haas' work - Beyond the Nation-State - epito-
mizes the essence of the functional-integrationist position.
Through the elaboration of a complicated international, suprana-
tional, and interpersonal network of political, economic, cultural,
educational, and religious relationships, the international commu-
nity will gradually, almost ineluctably, be drawn closer together to
the point where international organizations will take over the most
significant functions presently performed by governments of na-
tion-states. Eventually the nation-state as known today will, to use
Engels' descriptive terminology, "wither away," because it is super-
fluous to any type of metafunctional activity. It will be replaced as
the fundamental unit of worldwide political organization by a cen-
tralized world government or reduced to the status of a semi-sover-
eign constituent unit in a federal or confederal world state
analogous to the position occupied by the states of the American
Union under the Constitution or the Articles of Confederation.
Predictably, international law is destined to play a central role in
this metamorphosis of an international community into a transna-
tional or universal society.'
3
Forced by their functional-integrationist colleagues to concede
the relevance of international law to measures requiring coopera-
12. See E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE (1964).
13. See I. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES (3d rev. ed. 1964); R. KEOHANE &
J. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1976); TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (R.
Keohane & J. Nye eds. 1971).
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tion in international relations, international political scientists redi-
rected their attack upon the relevance of international law by
qualifying its application to concentrate solely upon matters of con-
flict among nations. Therefore, when international political scien-
tists assert the irrelevance of international law, they are not
concerned with the vast multitude of relatively inconsequential in-
ternational relations it governs. Instead they refer to that portion of
international relations which, they claim, escapes the effective con-
trol of international law and international organizations altogether
- conflict over matters of "vital national interest." Needless to
say, this is a term of art whose essence, like beauty, resides within
the eye of the beholder. 4
Although the number of such conflicts might be few in com-
parison to the great bulk of international relations, they comprise
those matters of "high international politics" concerning the very
survival of nation-states, the international system, and the human
race. International law considerations do not and should not in-
trude into such areas. If international law considerations do in-
trude into such areas, however, their intervention should be limited
to the extent that they serve as a source for the manufacture of ad
hoc or expostfacto justifications for decisions taken primarily on
the basis of non-legal factors such as national interest, power, and
economics.
In this view of international politics, international law is de-
void of any intrinsic significance within the calculus of interna-
tional political decisionmaking. International law might indeed be
pertinent to, if not determinative of, the microcosmic elements of
international relations. However, such relevance, when multiplied
by the minimal importance of these matters, becomes inconsequen-
tial when compared to the irrelevance of international law to con-
flicts involving vital national interests. International law is
therefore irrelevant to those matters which count the most, or more
forcefully, to those matters which count for anything in interna-
tional relations.
14. See, e.g., M. KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 151-65
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
A. "Legalism-Moralism"
This denial of international law's relevance to international
politics is not characteristic of any one or more schools of interna-
tional political science, but is endemic to most of the discipline.
The genesis of international political science is attributable to an
extreme negative reaction to a so-called "legalist-moralist" or "uto-
pian" approach to international affairs, said to have influenced the
conduct of international relations by the United States and the
other Western democracies during the period between the First and
Second World Wars. International political science originated with
the "realist" or power politics oriented school of international
relations. Its best exemplars are the writings of scholars such as
Edward Hallett Carr, 15  Hans Morgenthau,' 6  Georg
Schwarzenberger, 7 and the careers and publications of statesmen
like Dean Acheson 8 and George Kennan.1 9 The gist of the realist
critique of the legalist-moralist or utopian approach to interwar di-
plomacy was as follows.
The Treaty of Versailles and especially its first part, the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations,2" were not the perfect incarnations
of truth, justice, peace, and righteousness they were alleged to be by
the statesmen of the Allied and Associated powers, particularly
Woodrow Wilson. Instead, they were instrumentalities of power
politics designed by the victorious nations of the First World War
15. See generally, e.g., E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939 (1939).
16. See generally H. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1951);
H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1949) [hereinafter cited as MORGENTHAU
(1949)]; H. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITICS (1946); Morgenthau, Posi-
tiism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as Morgenthau (1940)]. See also H. MORGENTHAU, TRUTH AND POWER (1970); PRINCIPLES
AND PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (H. Morgenthau & K. Thompson eds. 1950)
[hereinafter cited as Morgenthau & Thompson]; TRUTH AND TRAGEDY (K. Thompson & R.
Myers eds. 1977).
17. See, e.g., G. SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS (2d rev. ed. 1951);
Schwarzenberger, 7he Rule of Law and the Disintegration of the International Society, 33 AM.
J. INT'L L. 56 (1939).
18. See D. ACHESON, POWER AND DIPLOMACY (1958); D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE
CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT (1969).
19. See KENNAN, supra note 5; G. KENNAN, MEMOIRS 1925-1950 (1967); G. KENNAN,
RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN (1961); X, The Sources of Soviet Con-
duct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1947).
20. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 151 (Supp. 1919).
See also Treaty of Peace between the United States and Germany, Aug. 25, 1921, 42 Stat.
1939, T.S. No. 658, 12 L.N.T.S. 192.
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to secure and perpetuate,, with the maximum possible degree of le-
gal and institutional coercion, the favorable political, economic,
and military status quo granted to them after the armistices ending
the Great War. This treaty was imposed vi et armis in contraven-
tion of express promises given to induce surrender. If the peoples
of the world believed anything else, they were sorely deluded by the
ideological rhetoric deceptively manipulated by their leaders to fan
the flames of patriotic fervor in order to hasten the prosecution of
the war to its successful conclusion.
If the victors of Versailles intended to keep their ill-gotten
gains, they had to be willing to employ military force against a re-
vanchist Germany whenever the latter attempted to effectuate
resistance to the terms of the so-called peace. The Western democ-
racies, however, lacked the requisite will; instead of fighting to pre-
serve their hegemony, they preferred to trust in their own illusions.
They put their faith into such meaningless pronouncements as
Wilson's Fourteen Points,2' the Pact of Paris,22 and its corollary the
Stimson Doctrine;23 into the ineffectual organs of the League of
Nations - the Council, the Assembly, and the Permanent Court of
International Justice; into vapid and useless legalist-moralist doc-
trines like neutrality, disarmament, and arbitration; and into the
codification of international law and the formulation of a definition
of aggression. Finally, and perhaps most egregiously of all, they
actually believed in the existence of a beneficent world public opin-
ion that would will the world on its path towards peace.
These chimera were exploded when a powerful and resurgent
Germany, under the leadership of a demonic yet brilliant tyrant,
together with like-minded allies in Italy and Japan, challenged the
status quo of Versailles with the might of their armies.24 Inter-
21. Political realists generally date twentieth century utopianism from the delivery of
President Woodrow Wilson's fabled Fourteen Points Address to a joint session of Congress
on January 8, 1918. See, e.g., CARR, supra note 15, at 26-27; H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS 526-28 (5th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MORGENTHAU (1973)]. But see
generally I. CLAUDE, JR., POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94-204 (1962) (Wilson
was in fact a realist). For the text of the speech, see PRESIDENT WILSON'S STATE PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES 464-72 (A. Shaw ed. 1918).
22. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S.
No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
23. Reprinied in DEP'T OF STATE, PRESS RELEASES 41 (Jan. 7, 1932).
24. See generally W. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH (1960); PEACE
OR APPEASEMENT? 2-5 (F. Loewenheim ed. 1965) (notorious Hossbach memorandum). But
see B. RUSSETT, No CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER (1972); A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF
THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2d ed. 1961).
Vol. 10
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national law was a farcical joke to the Axis powers. The only way
to stop them was through the exercise of that lone medium they
understood and appreciated most - sheer, naked, brutal force,
stripped of all pretensions to anything but outright conquest.
Hence the need for their unconditional defeat and the demand for
their unconditional surrender.
It was unfortunate for the lives of millions of people that the
Allied enamor for international law meant they had to learn this
lesson the hard way, after the mistakes of Manchuria, Ethiopia, the
Rhineland, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. If West-
ern statesmen had been attentive to the historical imperatives of
power politics, and not fascinated by the seductive allurements of
international law, the Second World War might never have hap-
pened - or else it would have occurred in the middle 1930s when
the devastation would have been minor in comparison to that
which it was in actuality. They could have fought the war on their
own terms and at the time of their own choice, not those of their
adversaries. The Western democracies had only themselves to
blame for the Second World War.
Political realists delight in bandying about that famous quota-
tion from George Santayana: "Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it."25 Faced with a Communist
threat in the aftermath of the Second World War, they set out to
ensure that the United States and other Western democracies did
not, in their confrontation with the Soviet Union, repeat the same
grievous errors they had allegedly committed in their confrontation
with fascism - reliance upon the fictitious and fatuous strength of
international law and international organizations. In the political
milieu of the Cold War, the West must not repeat the same near
fatal mistake it had made after termination of the First World War
if it wished to avoid a suicidal Third World War.26 Hence the justi-
fication for the necessity of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan, the policy of containment, the Berlin airlift, the intervention
in Korea, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO). These elements of postwar American foreign policy
were quite properly founded upon pure calculations of national in-
terest and power politics.
25. i G. SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905). Rutsee E. MAY, "LEssoNs" OF
THE PAST (1973).
26. See generally H. HOLBORN, THE POLITICAL COLLAPSE OF EUROPE 182-93 (1951).
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B. Political Realism
The definitive exposition of a modern theory of political real-
ism appears in. Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations. 7 This
work set the discipline of international political science on its feet
and has remained its greatest classic. The book is written with the
power, brilliance, and analytical insight of an international lawyer
who had been profoundly disillusioned by the experience of the
Second World War.28 Little sympathy remained for international
law or international organizations, because they had been tragically
repudiated by history.
At time of publication, Politics Among Nations read like a
"declaration of war"2 9 against the legalist-moralist approach to in-
ternational relations. It railed against those who sought to interject
into the analysis of international relations and the calculations of
international political decisionmaking utopian or non-power ele-
ments in any fashion even reminiscent of a value judgment. Sheer
physical survival in a Machiavellian world of power politics, totali-
tarianism, and nuclear weapons must thereafter become the litmus
test for the validity of man's philosophical, moral, and legal presup-
positions.
Obviously, Morgenthau did not write upon a tabula rasa. He
was deeply influenced by Edward Hallet Carr's The Twenty Years'
Crisis, 1919-1939.3" Therein Carr appointed himself as founder of
the anti-utopian school of international affairs. He argued that
during the interwar period, the techniques of power politics had
been neglected, and worse yet, condemned and repudiated in favor
of a non-power oriented or anti-power-politics approach to interna-
tional politics. Carr held this denigration of power politics respon-
sible to a great extent for the predicament of the world in 1939.
Although written from this realist perspective, the book did strive
to achieve an uneasy synthesis of elements from both the utopian
movement and its realist critique. Carr argued that even though
the first and foremost duty of the statesman was to be pragmatic
27. See MORGENTHAU (1949), supra note 16.
28. Morgenthau has admitted that the Second World War played a decisive role in his
transition from international lawyer to political realist. Discussion with Professor Hans J.
Morgenthau, New York City (April 1972). See also Morgenthau (1940), supra note 16, at
260-61. For a philosophical explanation of political realism in terms of disillusioned liber-
alism, see J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 123-43 (1964).
29. Discussion with Professor Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Mass. (September 1973).
30. Discussion with Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, New York City (April 1973).
Vol. 10
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss2/2
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
and expedient, he could be moral as well. 3' Statesmen could have
their proverbial cake and eat it too, so long as they followed Carr's
recipe.
Morgenthau completely rejected any theoretical synthesis be-
tween power and non-power elements. Instead, he took up realist
theory where Carr had left it a decade before and carried it to its
logical and most extreme conclusions. For Morgenthau, interna-
tional law, morality, ethics, ideology, and even knowledge itself
were components in the power equation.32 There they were devoid
of non-instrumental significance or prescriptive worth, subject to
compulsory service as tools of power when deemed necessary for
the vital interests of state. Morgenthau erected no barriers to the
acquisitive nature of the nation-state beyond its own inherent limi-
tations and those constraints imposed upon it by the international
political milieu. In particular, he redirected the analysis of interna-
tional relations toward a predominant consideration of the balance
of power and power politics.
33
When reading any one of the five editions of Politics Among
Nations,34 spanning over a quarter of a century, one is struck by the
methodically ruthless vitality of Morgenthau's attack upon the le-
galist-moralist approach to international relations. Both the sub-
stance and the spirit of the book distinctly remind the reader of
Machiavelli's The Prince.35 What Machiavelli did to the Christian
ethos in politics, Morgenthau did to legalism-moralism in the study
of international relations.
After Morgenthau's initial declaration of war, there ensued a
pitched battle between the realists and their utopian adversaries.
The former were assisted in this intellectual struggle by a Cold War
that suddenly became "hot" in Korea in 1950. This seemed to
demonstrate the validity of the realist analogy of the Communist
threat to its fascist predecessor. The Korean War destroyed any
residual enthusiasm on the part of international political scientists
for international law and international organization.
By 1954, Morgenthau was able to declare that the battle had
been won, and all that remained to be done was for the realists to
31. CARR, supra note 15, at 302.
32. See generally MORGENTHAU (1973), supra note 21, at 4-15.
33. Id.
34. The foreword to the first edition and the prefaces to the last four editions are found
in id. at vii-xx.
35. See N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (M. Musa trans. & ed. 1964).
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consolidate their position.36 The split between international legal
studies and international political science was complete. In the esti-
mation of international political scientists, the realists had thor-
oughly discredited a legalist approach to international politics.
However, the process did not stop there.
C. Subsequent Development of International Political Science
Just as political realism represented an extreme negative reac-
tion against international law, the subsequent intellectual history of
international political science is a series of ideological chain reac-
tions precipitated by the theories of the realist school, which were
in turn precipitated by the legalist-moralist approach.37 The real-
ists were succeeded by advocates of a decisionmaking approach to
international relations. 38 They attacked the realists for their failure
to consider the microcosmic units and factors of analysis in interna-
tional political decisionmaking common to all nation-states. This
defect was said to have proceeded ineluctably from realism's almost
exclusive preoccupation with the macrocosmic movements of the
entire international system.
Next came the systems theorists, who strove to refocus the con-
centration of the discipline upon the broad systemic movements of
international affairs through the utilization of an analytical meth-
odology and terminology that was self-proclaimedly more rigorous,
36. H. MORGENTHAU, Preface to POLITICS AMONG NATIONS at vii (2d ed. rev. 1954).
37. For histories of international political science, see generally CONTEMPORARY THE-
ORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (S. Hoffmann ed. 1960); DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS
(H. Butterfield & M. Wight eds. 1966); Morgenthau & Thompson, supra note 16; Deutsch,
Major Changes in Political Science 1952-1977, 1978 PARTICIPATION II (Supp.) (the newslet-
ter of the International Political Science Association). General surveys of the diverse schools
of international political science can be found in CONTENDING APPROACHES TO INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS (K. Knorr & J. Rosenau eds. 1969); INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY (rev. ed. J. Rosenau 1969); THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (K. Knorr & S. Verba
eds. 1961).
38. See generally, e.g., FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (R. Snyder, H. Bruck & B.
Sapin eds. 1962); S. HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE 123-96 (1961); R. SNYDER, H.
BRUCK & B. SAPIN, DECISION-MAKING AS AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (Princeton U. Foreign Pol'y Analysis No. 3, 1954); H. WILENSKY, ORGANIZA-
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE 75-93 (1967); Hilsman, The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Re-
search Report, 3 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 361 (1959); Lindbloom, The Science of
"Muddling Through," 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959); Robinson & Snyder, Decision-Making in
international Politics, in INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR 435 (H. Kelman ed. 1965). See also M.
BROWN, FASHODA RECONSIDERED (1970) (application of the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin analytical
framework to the French involvement in the Fashoda incident and the Dreyfus affair); G.
PAIGE, THE KOREAN DECISION (1968) (application of the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin analytical
framework to the United States intervention in Korea).
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theoretical, value-free, and therefore more scientific and useful
than that applied by the realists.39 The systems theorists were in
turn followed by the behavioralists, who once again broke 'down
the units of analysis to the level of small decisionmaking groups
and even focused on the human mind to examine their respective
operational dynamics and impact upon the determination of for-
eign policy.
40
The game theorists employed a mathematically based method-
ology derived from pure economic theory to develop intricate and
subtle decisionmaking solutions to well-defined problems - solu-
tions with potential applicability to international politics.4 ' In a
39. See generally, e.g., R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR 19-157 (R. Howard & A. Fox trans.
1973); HAAS, supra note 12, at 51-85; FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 3, at 17-51; K. HOLSTI,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 29-101 (3d ed. 1977); KAPLAN,
supra note 14; R. OSGOOD & R. TUCKER, FORCE, ORDER, AND JUSTICE 169-79 (1967); R.
ROSECRANCE, ACTION AND REACTION IN WORLD POLITICS (1963), reviewed in Liska, Con-
tinuity and Change in International Systems, 16 WORLD POL. 118 (1963); K. WALTZ, MAN,
THE STATE AND WAR (1959); Alger, Comparison ofIntranational and International Politics,
57 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 406 (1963); Brecher, International Relations and Asian Studies.- The
Subordinate State System of Southern Asia, 15 WORLD POL. 213 (1963); Chi, The Chinese
Warlord System as an International System, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 405 (M. Kaplan ed. 1968) (practical application of the Kaplan framework); Franke,
The Italian City-State System as an International System, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 426 (M. Kaplan ed. 1968) (another practical application of the Kaplan
framework); Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 88; Masters, .4 Multi-Bloc Model of the International
System, 55 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 780 (1961); Masters, World Politics as a Primitive Political
System, 16 WORLD POL. 595 (1964); Russett, Delineating International Regions, in QUANTI-
TATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE 317 (J. Singer ed. 1968); Waltz,
The Stability of a Bipolar World, 93 DAEDALUS 881 (1964); Zartman, Africa as a Subordinate
State System in International Relations, 21 INT'L ORGANIZATION 545 (1967). See generally L.
VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY (1968); MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
40. See generally, e.g., J. DE RIVERA, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF FOREIGN
POLICY (1968); A. GEORGE & J. GEORGE, WOODROW WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE (1956);
R. JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1970); R. JERVIS, PER-
CEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976); Allport, The Role of Ex-
pectancy, in WAR 177 (rev. ed. L. Bramson & G. Goethals 1968); Greenstein, The Impact of
Personality on Politics. An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush, 61 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 629
(1967); Jaros, Hirsch & Fleron, The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American
Sub-Culture, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 564 (1968); Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception, 20
WORLD POL. 454 (1968); Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of Interna-
tional Relations, in INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR 565 (H. Kelman ed. 1965); May, War, Peace,
and Social Learning, in WAR 151 (rev. ed. L. Bramson & G. Goethals 1968); Tolman, Drives
Toward War, in WAR 159. See also R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD
(1967); W. LANGER, THE MIND OF ADOLF HITLER (1972); Aronson, The Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance.- A Current Perspective, 4 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. I (L.
Berkowitz ed. 1969); Blumer, Society as Symbolic Interaction, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
SOCIAL PROCESSES 179 (A. Rose ed. 1962).
41. See generally, e.g., MATHEMATICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICS (H. Alker, K.
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similar vein, strategic studies theorists explored the hypothetical
dynamics of a future world war in order to extrapolate in reverse
the essential elements of successful war-preventive or at least war-
ameliorative foreign and domestic policies.42 Then there emerged
the organizational theorists and those who proposed a "bureau-
cratic politics" approach to the interpretation of foreign policy deci-
sionmaking and execution by governments.43
There are now as many theories of international political sci-
ence as there are international political scientists. It has become a
truisni to state that international political science is a field in search
of a "paradigm." 4 Although the proponents of the respective theo-
ries differ among themselves in a plethora of ways, they share with
the realists a general disavowal of the utility of international law to
the study and practice of international politics. International politi-
cal science as a discipline is realist by birth and continued persua-
sion because of its solemn affirmance of the irrelevance of
international law to international politics.
III. DIRECTION FOR A SOLUTION
A. International Legal Positivism
Public international lawyers are not totally blameless for the
development of this predicament. Some remain oblivious to what
has happened, while others, aware of the problem, either do not
know what to do about it, or do not believe anything should be
Deutsch & A. Stoetzel eds. 1973); H. ALKER, MATHEMATICS & POLITICS 130-52 (1965); K.
DEUTSCH, THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 132-64 (2d ed. 1978); R. FISHER,
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969); KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 167-241; W.
RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962); T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT (1960); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECO-
NOMIC BEHAVIOR (1972).
42. See, e.g., H. KAHN, ON ESCALATION (rev. ed. 1968); H. KAHN, ON THERMONU-
CLEAR WAR (2d ed. 1961); H. KISSINGER, THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE (1960); H. KIS-
SINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1957); PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL
STRATEGY (H. Kissinger ed. 1965); T. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966); WohIstet-
ter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FOREIGN AFF. 211 (1959).
43. See generally, e.g., G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971); R. WOHLSTETrER,
PEARL HARBOR: WARNING AND DECISION (1962); Allison & Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics."
,4 Paradigm and Some Policy Implications, 24 WORLD POL. 40 (R. Tanter & R. Ullman eds.
Supp. 1972); George, The Casefor Multiole Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy, 66 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 751 (1972); Halperin, Why Bureaucrats Play Games, 2 FOREIGN POI.'Y 70 (1971).
See generally J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960).
44. This term is employed in the sense described in T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCI-
ENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
Vol. 10
14
California Western nternational Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss2/2
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
done: Let the political scientists hoist themselves with their own
petard! Yet this informed group simultaneously bemoans the in-
creasingly hard-nosed realist fashion in which American foreign
policy has been conducted since the end of the Second World War.
They are hopeful this policy approach reached its apotheosis in the
unfortunate history of American participation in the Vietnam War,
but they cannot be sure that this tendency stopped there.45
Falling into profound despair over their collective failure to
discover the magical solution that will allow them to return the
mainstream of American foreign policy to its proper legalist course,
public international lawyers have retreated into their personal
bailiwick of a strict international legal positivist approach to inter-
national politics. Here, thank heavens, there is a paradigm. The
standards of international legal positivism were established over
seventy years ago by the great Lassa Oppenheim.46 There is no
need to abandon or modify this credo.
The purpose of scholarly life lies in the mechanistic determina-
tion of the legality or illegality of a proposed or completed course
of conduct in accordance with the punctilious terms of public inter-
national law. Extraneous considerations - such as the relevance of
this sacerdotal rite to international politics - must not taint the
purity of the legal analysis. Illegality is treated as if it were a sin
deserving of punishment and damnation. By implication, the inter-
national legal positivists hold the keys to eternal salvation in their
annointed hands. Like Socrates and Christ, they preach that it is
better to die good than to live evil. Unfortunately, the first alterna-
tive is a very real possibility for the entire human race in a nuclear
age. No wonder international political scientists are exasperated by
public international lawyers.
Even some of those few international lawyers who do become
actively involved in the public debate over the great issues of
American foreign policy and world affairs seem to be impelled like
lemmings by a mysterious force that drives them into the deadly
embrace of their philosophical adversaries where they disavow
their heritage. There they try to out-do the realists by proving how
tough they really can be. The international lawyer who converts to
45. See generally D. HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972); W. SHAW-
CROSS, SIDESHOW (1979). But see E. RoSTow, LAW, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE
59-73 (1968).
46. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. 313 (1908).
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political realism is the most vehement, articulate, knowledgeable,
and effective advocate of the proposition that international law is
irrelevant to international politics. Hans Morgenthau is the leading
case in point.47
Public international lawyers must appreciate the importance of
re-establishing functional links with international political scien-
tists. They must take upon themselves the burden of proving to the
latter the relevance of international law to international politics. In
return, international political scientists must be fair and open-
minded enough to re-examine some of the most fundamental as-
sumptions underlying their discipline. Otherwise both groups will
continue to pursue those objectives they share in common - inter-
national peace, security, prosperity, human dignity, and social jus-
tice - in profound isolation from each other or, worse yet, the two
groups will pursue their common objectives while working at cross-
purposes to one another. They will rarely benefit from the wisdom,
counsel, experience, and direct assistance of their opposite num-
bers. Both academic disciplines can only continue to suffer
grievously from the prolongation of this unwarranted schism within
the community of international scholarship. Conversely, the analy-
sis of international politics can only be enhanced by a reintegration
of international legal studies with international political science.
In what direction does a solution to this problem lie? Quite
obviously, it is not in the further refinement of international legal
positivism, even assuming this could be done. Nor must it lie in the
proliferation of yet another pseudo-paradigmatic approach to inter-
national politics within the discipline of international political sci-
ence. As Hans Morgenthau once said concerning a methodological
seminar for international political scientists held at Princeton: "All
these people constantly sharpening their tools - but when are they
ever going to cut something?" The necessary tools are already at
hand. It is time to select those which are appropriate and to use
them.
47. Hans Morgenthau was trained as a lawyer in Germany, was admitted to the bar
there and practiced law for three years. He then became an assistant to the law faculty at the
University of Frankfurt (1931), acting President of the Labor Law Court in Frankfurt (193 1-
1933), and later professor of international law at the Institute for International and Eco-
nomic Studies at Madrid, Spain (1935-1936). After arrival in the United States, he became,
inter alia, assistant professor of law, history, and political science at the University of Kansas
in Kansas City (1939-1943) and was admitted to the Missouri Bar. 2 WHO'S WHO IN
AMERICA 2307 (40th ed. 1978-1979).
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B. McDougal-Lasswell Jurisprudence
At first glance, a prime area for exploration might seem to lie
in the perfection of the McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence of inter-
national law and international relations.48 This is because it
originated out of a solid social science background and has so far
represented the first and only full-scale theoretical attempt in either
discipline to marry international legal studies with the social sci-
ences. It would appear that McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence
could easily be reconciled with the principles and methodology of
international political science - at least more easily reconcilable
than international legal positivism.
Historically, however, this has not proven to be the case. In-
deed a somewhat skeptical observer could readily conclude that in-
ternational legal positivism, McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence,
and international political science have little in common with each
other today except for the fact that all are concerned with topics of
an international nature. McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence has
been and will remain unsuitable for the purpose of achieving the
reunification of international legal studies and international politi-
cal science. This is due to several fundamental reasons flowing
from the philosophical premises underlying all three approaches to
international relations.
The self-professed value orientation of McDougal-Lasswell ju-
risprudence49 is unacceptable to both international political scien-
tists and international legal positivists. Any theoretical bridge
attempting to span the gap between two disciplines must rely for its
support upon the paradigmatic requirements of each. McDougal-
Lasswell jurisprudence fails to do so.
1. International political science. As far as the international
political scientists are concerned, McDougal-Lasswell jurispru-
dence fails to differentiate the Machiavellian "is" from the Platonic
"ought to be" of international politics and international law.5" The
48. See McDougal & Lasswell, The Ident!fication and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
49. See, e.g., Lasswell, Introduction to M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MIN-
IMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER at xix, xix n.1 (1961).
50. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 35, at 127:
But my intention being to write something useful for whoever understands it, it
seemed to me more appropriate to pursue the effectual truth of the matter rather
than its imagined one. And many have imagined republics and principalities that
have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for there is such a gap between
how one lives and how one should live that he who neglects what is being done for
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establishment and preservation of this analytical distinction is axio-
matic to modem political philosophy and, afortiori, to interna-
tional political science. Without it, McDougal-Lasswell
jurisprudence cannot serve as the starting point for the develop-
ment of what must at least purport to be a "scientific" theory of the
relationship between law and politics in the international system.
2. International legalpositivism. The international legal posi-
tivists raise a similar objection. McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence
appears to be nothing more than an atavistic return to concepts of
natural law dressed up in the jargon of mid-twentieth century social
science. Oppenheim and his colleagues struggled valiantly and suc-
cessfully to extricate international legal studies from this morass.
They set the discipline upon its proper and "scientific" course of
international legal positivism. Their heirs must not allow the study
of international law to be seduced by natural law in the guise of
social science nonsense.
3. John Locke. Even if these interrelated objections to the
value-orientation of McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence could
somehow be overcome, the universality of its value system would
still remain seriously suspect. This is because McDougal-Lasswell
jurisprudence is firmly rooted in the Western liberal tradition of
natural right 5' so eloquently and definitively stated by John Locke
in his Second Treatise on Government.52 Indeed, the natural law
structure of McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence is the inexorable re-
sult of this natural right foundation.
In order to conceptualize his theory of rights, Locke postulated
the existence of a natural man, possessed of natural rights and liv-
ing in a state of nature where he is governed by natural laws. These
laws are the product of human reason flowing from man's natural
desire for self-preservation. Man creates civil society for the ex-
press purpose of better protecting and promoting his own existence.
Yet civil society is only one step removed from the state of nature.
Human nature remains essentially the same in both situations.
what should be done will learn his destruction rather than his preservation: for a
man who wishes to profess goodness at all times must fall to ruin among so many
who are not good. Whereby it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain his
position to learn how not to be good, and to use it or not according to necessity.
51. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights."
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. L. REV. 919, 938-43 (1975).
52. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
305, 327-44 (rev. ed. P. Laslett 1960).
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Man is primarily concerned with the advancement of his own self-
interest in each.
Within civil society man must be free to do whatever he wants
so long as he does not infringe upon the right of his fellow man to
do the same. It is the purpose of government to determine by law
the limits of man's freedom of action vis-,i-vis his fellow citizens in
the event of conflict between them. But within these limited restric-
tions man must remain free to pursue his own self-interest as he
sees fit. This is especially true in the economic sphere of activities.
Ultimately, however, whether in the state of nature or in civil soci-
ety, man owes no affirmative obligation toward his fellow men to
improve their condition.
4. Rousseau, Bentham, and Marx. Not all Western liberal
philosophers believe that human rights are or should be considered
to be natural, imprescriptible, or inalienable. One theory, espoused
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham, is that the enjoy-
ment of rights is conditioned upon the performance of positive du-
ties, not simply upon the mere abstention from negative harm.
Rousseau explained the theory in terms of the concept of the "gen-
eral will"; Bentham explained the theory by the principle of "util-
ity." Yet the two theories are functionally similar when it comes to
establishing the priority of social duty over human rights. There is
no such thing as a natural man with natural rights in a state of
nature ruled by natural law. Man is a social creature entirely de-
pendent upon civil society for both his physical survival and his
moral development. Human rights do not exist in the abstract but
can only be considered within the context of political society.
It is the primary purpose of government to advance the com-
mon interest for the betterment of all. If necessary, an individual
must be willing to forego to some extent the pursuit of his own self-
interest for the good of others. Indeed, a citizen will best achieve
the fulfilment of his own desires through the attainment of the com-
mon good. However, if a citizen is unwilling to act toward this end,
the laws of civil society must force him to be altruistic. Human
rights are thus a function of social duty. Failure to discharge the
latter not only justifies but usually requires a deprivation in the ex-
ercise of the former.
The seminal source for this theory of human rights can be
found in the writings of Rousseau and Bentham.53 From there it
53. See J. BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823); J. Rous-
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percolated into Marxist philosophy. Marx adopted Benthamite
utilitarian principles and put them to the service of one segment in
the Rousseauian general will - the proletariat. Human rights are
thus determined by calculations of utility designed to enhance the
condition of the proletariat.54
5. Human rights versus capitalism. Locke, on the one hand,
and Rousseau, Bentham, and Marx, on the other, represent the
philosophical archetypes for the debate over the proper relationship
between fundamental human rights and the requirements of social
and state obligation currently raging between First World countries
("capitalist" and "democratic") and Third World countries ("devel-
oping" and "authoritarian"), which are supported by Second
World countries ("communist" and "totalitarian"). The funda-
mental issue is whether human rights exist prior to and independ-
ent from the needs of civil society, especially in the area of
economic development. Due to its philosophical presuppositions,
McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence has irreversibly chosen sides in
this debate in favor of the Lockeian position.55 Locke's exposition
of one of the first fully articulated modem theories of human rights
postulates a preeminent role for private property. The institution
of private property was theorized to exist antecedent to and in-
dependent of civil society. Indeed civil society itself was estab-
lished for the very purpose of protecting man's "property."56 The
significant fact is that Locke found it necessary to explain the rights
to life and liberty in terms of and as variants to the concept of prop-
erty. Use of the term property in this fashion represented a form of
philosophical chattellization of the rights to life and liberty.57
SEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY (L. Crocker
ed. 1967).
54. See KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS (T. Bottomore trans. & ed. 1964); K. MARX,
THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE (2d ed. 1869); BASIC WRITINGS ON
POLITICS & PHILOSOPHY: MARX & ENGELS (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
55. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 49, at 377-79 (Marxism is specifically
rejected) M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER
76-79 (1980). See generally Berman, American and Soviet Perspectives on Human Rights, 22
WORLD VIEW 15 (1979).
56. Locke defined "property" to include life, liberty, and estate. See Laslett, Introduc-
tion to J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 115-16 (rev. ed. P. Laslett 1960).
57. This interpretation is consistent with Locke's labor theory of value. See Locke,
supra note 52. The theory's original proposition was that every man has property in his own
person. By mixing the property of his own person with the elements of nature through his
own labor, man can rightfully lay claim to the products resulting therefrom as his own pos-
sessions. Here, on a conceptual level, man himself is considered in terms of property.
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Moreover, the right of estate was thereby rendered almost as funda-
mental a human right as were the rights to life and liberty. From a
Marxist perspective, Locke is nothing more than an apologist for
capitalism, and his theory of human rights is no more than an ide-
ology to legitimate and perpetuate capitalist exploitation. 8 It is ev-
ident that McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence postulates capitalism
to be the preferred economic system for the realization of its con-
ception of fundamental human rights. 9
6. American foreign policy. A similar line of analysis can ac-
count for the oft-repeated criticism of McDougal-Lasswell jurispru-
dence as it is applied to determine the propriety of specific instances
of state conduct in international politics - namely, that it possesses
an uncanny ability to justify in pseudo-legal terms, whatever course
of behavior the United States government deems expedient to its
national interest under particular historical conditions.60 Because
Lockeian liberal values serve as the starting point for the value-
oriented analysis of McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence, and be-
cause the United States government is founded upon Lockeian
principles (for example, the Declaration of Independence and the
Bill of Rights), it becomes a simple exercise in circular reasoning to
legitimate whatever America does in its relations with other na-
tions, simply because America does it.
Yet these values cannot serve as the basis for the formation of
a system of world order encompassing countries, peoples, and civi-
lizations espousing fundamentally different if not antithetical sets
of values. Indeed, insistence upon the primacy of Lockeian liberal
58. Locke reduces man to a form of property. Locke's chattellization of the human
being becomes the philosophical explanation for the exploitation of the proletariat by the
bourgeoisie and the fundamental alienation of all human beings within capitalist society.
59. See McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order. Principles of Content and
Procedurefor Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387, 412 (1974);
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order. A Framework/or Pol-
icy-Orientedlnquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 252-53 (1969). Underlying McDougal-Lasswell
jurisprudence on human rights is the assumption that it is legitimate to discriminate in terms
of wealth for reasons relevant to merit or capability. This violates the fundamental canon of
communism: "[Firom each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" K.
MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 10 (C. Dutt ed. 1938).
60. See, e.g., McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 597 (1963). In McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 49, at 536, the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention was branded "amorphous." Yet 15 years later, the Israeli raid at
Entebbe was deemed to be "justified as a humanitarian intervention, a doctrine whose roots
go back, at least, to Hugo Grotius." Letter from Myres S. McDougal and Michael Reisman
to the New York Times Editor (July 9, 1976), reprinted in N.Y. Times, July 16, 1976, §.A, at
20, col. 3.
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values in international relations might only lead to conflict and
world disorder. So even if international scholars set out to con-
struct a value-oriented jurisprudence of international relations,
McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence should not be the point d'appui.
C The "International Crises and the Role of Law" Series
1. Descriptive statement. The recently completed series of
books entitled International Crises and the Role of Law,6 ' published
under the auspices of the American Society of International Law, is
a step in the proper direction toward re-establishing the relevance
of international law to international politics. Yet it did not go far
enough. In that series, the case studies performed the invaluable
first task of assembling the historical data into a series of descrip-
tive statements establishing the role that international law and in-
ternational organizations played during the respective crises. This
author would like to suggest the utility of engaging in at least four
further stages of analysis.
2. Theoretical proposition. For each case study, an effort
must be made to deduce from the historical descriptive statements a
set of theoretical propositions about the role international law and
international organizations played in relation to the crisis at hand.
For example:
a. Descriptive statement. During the Cuban missile crisis,
among the various alternative courses of conduct considered by
the United States government (for example, invasion, surgical
airstrike, blockade, "quarantine"), it chose to implement a
"quarantine" of Cuba with the endorsement of the Organization
of American States.
b. Theoretical proposition. During time of international
crisis, a government will respond at the outset with that viable
option it perceives to be the least violative of the international
legal order.
This theoretical proposition gives rise to a host of interesting
and important questions. Does it hold true for "totalitarian" gov-
ernments as well as for "democratic" governments? What if the
original "least violative" response fails? Does the approval of a
61. See G. ABI-SAAB, THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO 1960-1964
(1978); R. BOWIE, SUEZ 1956 (1974); A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1974); T.
EHRLICH, CYPRUS 1958-1967 (1974); R. FISHER, POINTS OF CHOICE (1978), reviewed in
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"least violative" but plausibly illegal response by an international
organization adversely affect its ability to participate in the effective
management of future international crises?
Such questions cannot be answered solely by reference to the
Cuban missile crisis. The theoretical proposition can only serve as
the starting point for further investigation of these issues in regard
to other international crises. Without the derivation of such theo-
retical propositions, however, there is no meaningful way to con-
nect the lessons of one case study with those of any other.
3. Theoretical model. If, but only if, a set of general princi-
ples concerning the role of international law in each particular cri-
sis has been formulated, would it then be possible to enter upon the
next stage of the analytical process. This third step would consist of
synthesizing the theoretical propositions drawn from each case
study into one theoretical model for the role of international law in
time of international crisis. The usefulness of that model would be
a function of the number, quality, and diversity of the individual
case studies upon which it is based. However, the initial construc-
tion of a theoretical model would permit the generation of addi-
tional case studies undertaken in reference to it and thereby permit
the further perfection of the model.
Although guided by a common purpose, the individual case
studies comprising the International Crises and the Role of Law se-
ries do not share a mutual framework for analysis. Nor has this
shortcoming been remedied by relating the conclusions of one
study to those of another in a rigorous methodological fashion.
The development of a theoretical model for the role of law in inter-
national crisis will solve both of these interrelated problems.
4. Testing the model. With the accumulation of interrelated
case studies, the derivation of theoretical propositions therefrom,
and their consequent addition to the theoretical model, researchers
should eventually feel confident enough with the model to formu-
late and test some predictive hypotheses regarding the role of inter-
national law in time of international crisis. These predictive
hypotheses could be verified by reference to future international
crises or to past international crises that have yet to be researched.
As Thomas Kuhn points out in his Structure of Scientiftc Revolu-
tions,6 one of the best and most assured methodologies for proof of
62. KuHN, supra note 44.
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the validity of a theoretical model is the formulation, testing, and
verification of predictive hypotheses logically derived from it.63
5. Recommendationsfor change. By further perfection of the
model in this manner, it would finally be possible to suggest some
tentative prescriptive statements about how historical conditions
could be altered so as to optimize the role of international law in
time of international crisis. Recommendations could be made con-
cerning the promulgation of new international law, the improve-
ment of international organizations, or the alteration of national or
international decisionmaking procedures and institutions in order
to better cope with international crisis. Here the speculations of
academic theory enter the domain of political reality, and the gen-
eral admonition of Hans Morgenthau to all theorists is applicable:
"In the world of the intellectual, ideas meet with ideas, and any-
thing goes that is presented cleverly and with assurance. In the po-
litical world, ideas meet with facts, which make mincemeat of the
wrong ideas and throw the ideas into the ashcan of history."6 4
Progress through each of these additional four stages depends
upon the adequate fulfilment of the immediately preceding stage.
Any attempt to move directly from stage one to stage five without
proceeding through the intermediate stages would constitute an in-
advisably venturesome enterprise. Crisis becomes too dangerous a
phenomenon in a nuclear world for academic theorists to shoot
from the hip on their pet theories.
Even then, the performance of this final task of formulating
prescriptive statements assumes that international law does indeed
have a positive role to play in the prevention, management, or reso-
lution of international crises. This contention is denied by interna-
tional political scientists who, for the most part, would assert the
essential irrelevance of international law to international crises, be-
cause international crises involve conflicts of "vital national inter-
est" and are the stuff of "high international politics." The
interconnected assumptions underlying the respective positions of
public international lawyers and international political scientists on
this point need to be exposed, tested, proved, disproved, or im-
proved by the facts of history itself. Rhetoric alone on either side
will not suffice to do the job. The International Crises and the Role
63. Id. at 153-55.
64. Statement by Hans Morgenthau (July 1961) (copy on file with the California West-
ern International Law Journal).
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of Law series took the first invaluable step in that direction. It is in
this direction that a solution to the problem of the "irrelevance of
international law" lies. Hopefully, it is also by movement in this
direction that the reintegration of international legal studies and
international political science can occur.
IV. CONCLUSION
The most appropriate conclusion to this essay is a descrip-
tion of a presentation made by Hans Morgenthau before Stanley
Hoffmann's Seminar on American Foreign Policy at the Center for
International Affairs of Harvard University in May 1978.65
Morgenthau's basic thesis was that in a world of nuclear weapons
systems developed to the current level of technical expertise where
the instantaneous destruction of mankind is imminently possible,
power politics as a principle for the conduct of international rela-
tions has become fatally defective and could ultimately result in the
destruction of the human race through a suicidal Third World War.
Morgenthau delineated what he believed to be the only possible
solution to this overarching dilemma of the international political
system - formation of a world government. He did not go into
specific details about the process of its creation from the present
nation-state system, nor did he outline its preferred configuration.
He did suggest, however, that the United Nations could serve as
one possible basis for the gradual formation of a world govern-
ment.66
To be sure, this process would take a long time, and
Morgenthau refused to give an estimate of its probable period of
gestation. He did not even utter a prediction as to whether the cre-
ation of a world government was historically possible at this stage
of human evolution. He simply stated that world government has
become an historical imperative.
As a stage penultimate to and facilitative of a world govern-
ment, the nations of the world, must, for the immediate future, par-
ticipate in the creation of a plethora of functionally related
international organizations in order to cope with the subjects of pri-
65. Although the talk was all too brief, its theoretical implications for international po-
litical science, international legal studies, and international politics were profound. What
follows is a reconstruction of this lecture taken from this author's own notes.
66. He did not comment on the utility of the Clark-Sohn proposals. See G. CLARK & L.
SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (3d ed. 1966). See also L. SOHN, CASES ON
UNITED NATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1967); L. SOHN, THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION (1968).
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mary concern to international relations. The development of a
large number of specialized international organizations could even-
tually lead, through a process of gradual integration, to the forma-
tion of a world government. Here Morgenthau joined the camp of
his functional-integrationist colleagues, perhaps much to their sur-
prise or chagrin.67
International political scientists or public international lawyers
67. Needless to say, those in the audience familiar with his work were thunderstruck by
what appeared to be a thoroughgoing repudiation of the fundamental principles he had suc-
cessfully advocated on behalf of both himself and international political science for the past
30 years. In an attempt to make certain that this was his intention, this author asked him a
series of three interrelated questions. Morgenthau's startling answers need no explanation.
To paraphrase the content of the discussion:
Q: Since international organizations and world government now seem to be the
key to the future of mankind, and since both are and will be the products of
international law, does this not mean that international law and therefore in-
ternational lawyers are relevant and indeed essential to the future of interna-
tional relations?
A: Well of course international law must play an important role in the creation of
international organizations and the formation of a world government. But I
do not know if I would go so far as to include international lawyers within this
category of what is essential.
Q: Then, with all due respect, I am somewhat perplexed and at a loss as to how I
should understand what you are saying. You come here today and tell us that
it is vital for the future of mankind to create a world government through the
progressive development of international organizations which, you have ad-
mitted, requires a central role for international law. And I do not see how you
can realistically exclude international lawyers from that process. Haveyou not
come full circle?
You started out many years ago as a young man, trained in the law,
teaching international law and publishing in the field. Then along came the
Second World War, and you and a group of disenchanted international law-
yers broke away from the discipline and established international political sci-
ence as a separate and independent discipline, based upon essentially anti-
legalist or legal-nihilist premises-those of power politics and what you called
"political realism." For thirty years you stridently argued this position against
all comers, whether international lawyers or other international political scien-
tists. Now you come here and tell us that you have changed your mind. That
it is necessary for us all to turn to world government, international organiza-
tions, international law and, by implication, international lawyers simply in
order to survive into the next century. Have you not returned to the point
where you started over fifty years ago?
A: You are perfectly correct. But that just goes to show that you can learn some-
thing new in thirty years.
Q: In other words, you have come out precisely where Professor Louis Sohn of
the Harvard Law School has been for the past thirty years?
A: Sohn and I might start from different principles, but we have arrived at the
same conclusion.
Those familiar with the work of both men could not have been more surprised by
Morgenthau's answers. In the study of international relations it had always been assumed
that there existed a spectrum of viewpoints ranging from the extreme realism of a Hans
Morgenthau, on the one side, to the extreme idealism of a Louis Sohn, on the other, and with
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may agree or disagree with Morgenthau, but the significant fact is
that the very founder of the school for the irrelevance of interna-
tional law has changed his mind on the subject. We should all take
note of this development and give Morgenthau's reversal of opin-
ion serious consideration. Is international law relevant or irrele-
vant to international politics? Is there any justification for the
continuance of the schism between international political science
and international legal studies? These are weighty questions for all
international political scientists and public international lawyers to
ponder. The answers should be forthcoming if we can only bring
ourselves to work together toward their solution. The time to start
is now.68
68. How this can be done will be demonstrated in a forthcoming article, International
Law in Time of Crisis.
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